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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-2919
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ELONZO L. MATTHEWS,
         Appellant.
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 07-cr-00245-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 21, 2009
Before:   FUENTES, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: May 29, 2009 )
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Elonzo Matthews pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§  922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).  He reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s
    Bouye did not use his personal vehicle to conduct surveillance during the controlled1
buy.  
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ruling pre-trial motions he had filed.  On appeal, he argues that the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop and search him and that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.  Because there was reasonable suspicion to
effectuate the search and seizure and because we have previously held that § 922(g)(1) is
constitutional, see United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001), we will
affirm.
I. Background
On July 21, 2006, New Castle, Pennsylvania police detective Chris Bouye
conducted surveillance of a controlled purchase of crack cocaine.  He observed a blue
Ford Taurus arrive and the driver, later identified as Ms. Katie White, sell crack cocaine
to an undercover police officer.  During the purchase, Officer Bouye noticed Elonzo
Matthews in the passenger seat.  Bouye recognized Matthews because the two had grown
up together and Bouye had been involved in arresting Matthews previously.  The police
did not make any arrests following the controlled purchase, and Bouye returned to the
police station for a debriefing. 
Bouye left the police station at around 8:30 P.M. dressed in civilian clothing and
proceeded to drive home in his personal vehicle.   While driving, he noticed a blue Ford1
Taurus, similar to the car he had seen during the controlled drug purchase, parked one
     The vehicle was registered to Matthews but was being driven by White because2
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block from the police station.  The car began to follow Bouye and stayed behind him
through several turns until he finally pulled over so it could pass.  The car drove past
Bouye and turned into a residential driveway.  As the vehicle passed, Bouye observed that
the occupants were Matthews and White.  
Concerned for his safety, Bouye blocked the driveway with his vehicle.  He
approached the Taurus with his gun drawn, showed his police badge, and asked White
and Matthews why they were following him.  He then asked them to provide
identification.  During the course of the encounter, Matthews attempted to reach for the
glove box several times but was ordered to stop by Bouye.  After White provided her
diver’s licence, Bouye called for backup using his cell phone.  When backup officers
arrived, they searched Matthews and asked him for consent to search his vehicle.  2
Matthews consented to the search, and police found both a handgun between the
passenger seat and the center console and a magazine clip in the glove box.  A short time
later, police discovered a small bag of crack cocaine on the ground near where Matthews
had been standing during the search of his vehicle. 
Matthews was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and, shortly thereafter, filed a motion to dismiss the
indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce
     The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have jurisdiction3
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Clause.  The District Court denied his motion.  Next, Matthews filed a motion to suppress
the gun, magazine clip, and statements he made following the stop because police lacked
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.  The District Court denied that motion too,
concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Matthews “was engaged in
criminal activity and presented a reasonable apprehension of danger to the police
officers.”  (App. at 5.)  
Matthews pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm but explicitly
reserved the right to appeal the District Court’s decisions to deny his motions to dismiss
and to suppress.  The Court sentenced Matthews to 92 months in prison, to be followed
by three years of supervised release.  Matthews filed a timely appeal and challenges the
District Court’s denial of his motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress evidence. 
II. Discussion3
A. Motion to Suppress
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to
the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over the Court’s application
of law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).
Matthews contends that, because Officer Bouye did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop him, the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized
5from his car and statements he made following the stop.  Warrantless searches and
seizures are generally unconstitutional.  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d
Cir. 2008).  Police may, however, conduct a reasonable investigatory stop “when there is
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.”  Id. (citing Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). 
Officer Bouye observed Matthews and White participate in a controlled drug
purchase.  A short time later, he noticed that they were following him as he drove home
from the police station.  Bouye and Matthews had known each other for years, and it was
not unreasonable for Bouye to be concerned that Matthews had recognized him from the
surveillance Bouye had conducted earlier that evening.  Under these circumstances,
Bouye had a reasonable suspicion that Matthews and White were following him
purposely and conducting some amateurish counter-surveillance in support of their illegal
drug activity.  Because he had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot,
Officer Bouye was permitted under the Fourth Amendment to conduct an investigatory
stop.  See Silveus, 542 F.3d at 999.  As Bouye’s stop of Matthew’s vehicle was
constitutional, and the consent to search the vehicle has not been challenged, the District
Court properly denied Matthews’s motion to suppress. 
B. Constitutional Challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
Matthews contends that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  We specifically addressed this issue in
6United States v. Singletary and held that § 922(g)(1) was an appropriate exercise of
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.  268 F.3d at 205.  As we have already
decided this issue, we need not revisit it here. 
III. Conclusion
Because Officer Bouye had reasonable suspicion to stop Matthews and § 922(g)(1)
is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, we will
affirm. 
